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iReX Files, Academic Reports, and “American” Adventures  
of Soviet Americanists during the Brezhnev era
Soviet Americanists’ participation in the uS‑Soviet exchange program became the most signiicant part of the relaxation of international tensions between the Soviet union and the united States during the Brezhnev era, –noted historian Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, one of the pioneers of American studies in the uSSr.– These Soviet experts in American studies, who traveled to America, contributed to the real “academic détente,” bringing back home not only the new documents and literature they discovered in American archives and libraries, but also human contacts and fresh impressions of friendly interactions with American people. eventually all these Soviet visitors to America became leading Soviet experts in American studies.1 
Soviet Americanists became participants in the important cultural dialogue between 
Soviet and American societies, opening both societies to each other and widening 
their intellectual and cultural horizons. At the same time the Soviet scholars’ 
actions were monitored by the Soviet intelligence and representatives of various 
uS federal agencies. Both Soviet and American intelligence and various academic 
and government agencies collected numerous iles of precious information about 
these visits. comparison of this information gives us a unique picture of cultural 
dialogue during the academic exchanges in the era of détente from two different 
points of view. During the 1990s many Soviet Americanists emphasized another 
very important aspect of the academic exchange program – the creation of a new 
international community of scholars. As Marina Vlasova, a russian expert in uS 
political history, observed, the détente of the 1970s 
[…] was not only the Beatles music on Soviet radio, ABBA and Smokey concerts on Soviet television, or new Western blockbusters in Soviet movie theaters. 
1. interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, May 21, 2001, Moscow.
Cahiers du monde russe, 54/1‑2, Janvier‑juin 2013, p. 297‑328.
298 Sergei i. Zhuk
it was also the irst attempts at integration by Soviet scholars, especially experts in uS history, politics and culture, into the international academic community.2 
using the documents of the international research and exchanges Board (ireX) 
from the Manuscript Collection of the Library of Congress, Soviet travel reports, 
personal memoirs, correspondence, more than seventy interviews, and concentrating 
on personal stories of Soviet Americanists, this essay explores the cultural dialogue 
between Soviet and American scholars, and also the role of Soviet Americanists in 
the Soviet system of knowledge production during the Brezhnev era (1964‑1982).3 
According to Michel de Certeau, in modern social systems of knowledge 
production such as communities of Soviet Americanists, “the imposed knowledge 
and symbolisms [by the Soviet ideologists] become objects manipulated by 
practitioners [the Soviet Americanists] who have not produced them.” in de Certeau’s 
interpretation, such practitioners usually subverted practices, and representations 
that were imposed on them from within, – not by rejecting them or by transforming 
them (though that occurred as well), but in many different ways. Practitioners of 
knowledge production “metaphorized the dominant order: they made it function in 
another register. They remained “other” within the system which they assimilated 
and which assimilated them externally. They diverted it without leaving it.”4 
De Certeau’s ideas inluenced recent scholarship about theories and practices of 
late socialism, and about discursive practices and identity formation in post‑Stalin 
Soviet society, especially works by Slava gerovitch, Alexei Yurchak, and Juliane 
Fürst.5 As these scholars explained, in Soviet knowledge production “authoritative 
2. interview with Marina Vlasova and Vadim koleneko, Moscow, March 20, 1991. See also the memoirs: georgii Arbatov, The System: An insider’s Life in Soviet Politics (New York, 1992), 289‑290, 292. Compare with the influences of cultural détente on provincial Soviet society in: Sergei i. Zhuk, rock and roll in the rocket City: The West, identity, and ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960‑1985 (Baltimore, MD, 2010); idem, “The ‘Closed’ Soviet Society and the West: Consumption of the Western Cultural Products, Youth and identity in Soviet ukraine during the 1970s,” in Marie‑Janine Calic, Sabine Dabringhaus, Dietmar Neutatz and Julia Obertreis, eds., The Crisis of Socialist Modernity: The Soviet union and Yugoslavia in the 1970s, (göttingen, 2011), 87‑117.
3. Besides Arbatov’s memoirs, i use Bolkhovitinov’s personal materials. The first attempt to analyze the origin of American studies in the uSSr through his own autobiography was made by Bolkhovitinov in english in 1980: Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, “how i Became a historian,” Journal of American Studies 14, 1 (1980): 103‑114. After this first attempt of writing his autobiography, in the late 1970s, Bolkhovitinov returned to writing his memoirs (now in russian) only during 1990 at the end of perestroika. he kept writing his autobiography for many years, publishing some excerpts in various collections and journals. (See N.N. Bolkhovitinov, “O vremeni i o sebe: zametki istorika [About Time and Myself: Notes of historian]”, 
istoriki Rossii. [historians of russia] Vypusk 1 (M., 1997), 67‑80.) But the major text of his memoirs, which Bolkhovitinov proofread the last time in 2005, was never published. i use this text as a major source for this study: Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Vospominaniia [memoirs] (M., 2005) [unpublished, typewritten manuscript of 62 pages, which begins with the crossed title “Schastlivaia pora detstva” (The happy Time of Childhood)] (hereafter ‑ Vospominaniia). 
4. michel de certeau, The Practice of everyday Life. Translated by Steven rendall (Berkeley, CA, 1989), 31.
5. See especially Slava gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A history of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Alexei Yurchak, everything Was Forever, until it Was 
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discourse coheres around a strict external idea or dogma […] and occupies a 
particular position within the discursive regime of a period,” while “all other types 
of discourse are organized around it.”6 using ideas of this scholarship, especially a 
concept of interaction between authoritative and professional discourses, this essay 
explores how the participation in uS‑Soviet academic exchanges programs affected 
various discursive practices of the Soviet Americanists. This essay gives also a 
new look at the problems of western‑Soviet cultural and academic dialogue after 
Stalin, offered recently by robert english, Vladislav Zubok, and other scholars,7 
concentrating on what english called the Soviet scholars’ efforts “to move their 
country toward broader integration with the liberal international community.”8 
American Studies in the uSSr and Academic exchanges
Contemporaries noted that the Cold War confrontation between the united States 
and the Soviet union led to an intense “ideological offensive” when thousands of 
historians and social scientists in both countries became involved in area studies 
such as Soviet studies in the uSA and American studies in the uSSr. During the 
Cold War in the 1960s and the 1970s, the most important centers of the various 
area studies in the Soviet union were those devoted to uS history, economy, 
politics and culture.9 But in contrast to the American side of the Cold War story, 
where the uS government and various corporations had funded college‑based 
centers for Soviet studies as early as the 1940s, the Soviet centers of American 
studies were organized much later and only in the Moscow‑based institutions of 
No More: The Last Soviet generation (Princeton, NJ, 2005), and Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last generation: Soviet Post‑War Youth and the emergence of Mature Socialism (New York, 2010). 
6. Yurchak, everything Was Forever, until it Was No More, 14.
7. robert english, russia and idea of the West: gorbachev, intellectuals, and the end of the Cold War (New York, 2000); Vladislav Zubok, A Failed empire: The Soviet union in the Cold War From Stalin to gorbachev (Chapel hill, NC, 2007); idem, Zhivago’s Children: The Last 
Russian intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA., 2009); Yurchak, everything Was Forever, until it Was No More; and Andrei kozovoi, Par‑delà le mur: La culture de guerre froide soviétique entre deux détentes (P., 2009). See also the idealistic biographies of the major Soviet Americanists: B.D. kozenko, “igor Petrovich Dementiev,” in g. Sevostianov, ed., Portrety istorikov: vremia i sud´by [Portraits of historians: Time and Fates],Vol. 4, (M.,  2004), 143‑156; A. Manykin, V.  Sogrin, “Nikolai Vasil´evich Sivachev,” ibid, 422‑436; A.Yu.  Petrov, “Bolkhovitinov Nikolai Nikolaevich (1930‑2008),” in Sevostianov, ed.,  Portrety istorikov, Vol. 5, (M., 2010), 163‑177; B. kozenko, i. kurilla, “ivanov robert Fedorovich (1925‑2003),” ibid., 270‑283; r.  ganelin, V.  Noskov, V.  Pleshkov, “Fursenko Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (1922‑2004),” ibid., 555‑571. 
8. english, russia and idea of the West, 126. Compare with the Soviet point of view in e.A. Dudzinskaia, Mezhdunarodnye nauchnye sviazi sovetskikh istorikov [the international Scholarly Connections of Soviet historians] (M., 1978). 
9. Christopher Simpson, “introduction,” in Christopher Simpson, ed., universities and empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War, (New York, 1998), xvi. See also a good historical survey of development of the American centers for russian and Soviet studies as the Cold War’s area studies centers in David engerman, know Your enemy: The rise and Fall of America’s Soviet experts (New York, 2009).
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the uSSr Academy of Sciences. From the early beginning, in the united States 
various russian and Soviet research centers were spread all over the country in a 
de‑centralized fashion and were afiliated with different colleges and universities. 
All these American centers were professionally organized, well‑funded, and they 
immediately became integrated in a so‑called academic‑national security complex, 
especially during the late 1940s and the 1950s.10 
Paradoxically, the irst professional Soviet centers of American studies appeared 
much later, only after Stalin’s death, during the relaxation of international tensions 
and improvement of the uS‑Soviet relations. institutionalization of the Soviet 
centers of American studies according to the directives of the Soviet state and the 
kgB began in special research institutes of the uSSr Academy of Sciences only 
in the 1960s and the 1970s. But the real peak of popularity and wide spread of 
American studies in the uSSr during the late 1970s and the 1980s was the result 
of individual efforts by local college professors‑enthusiasts who created their own 
schools for studies of uS history, politics, economics, and culture at the major 
universities in big industrial cities of the uSSr.11
in 1953, the Soviet government created the irst special center for the “studies 
of American countries” at the institute of history of the uSSr Academy of 
Science. From the beginning this center united the experts in Latin American and 
uS history. After the division of the institute of history in 1968 in two separate 
institutes – of World history and uSSr history – the center for the “studies of 
American countries” was also divided. All specialists in Latin American history 
left the center. After this division the center was transformed in a new “sector of 
history of the uSA and Canada” at the new institute of World history [hereafter – 
iVi] under leadership of a former kgB/intelligence oficer grigorii Sevostianov. 
he was inally replaced in 1988 by Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, who was not connected 
to the kgB.12 This became the normal institutional practice for leaders of all centers 
for American studies in the Soviet union to be approved by the kgB, or to have 
10. See about this in engerman, know Your enemy, and in Simpson, ed., universities and 
empire, xx.
11. See a growing literature about the Soviet area studies during the Cold War, especially: Tyrus W.  Cobb, “National Security Perspectives of Soviet ‘ThinkTanks’,” Problems of 
communism, 6 (1981): 51–59; rose gottemoeller and Paul Fritz Langer, Foreign Area Studies in the uSSr: Training and employment of Specialists, (Santa Monica, 1983); V.M. Danylenko, ukraina v mizhnarodnykh naukovo‑tekhnichnykh zv´iazkakh (70‑80‑i rr.) [ukraine in the international Scientific and Technical relations, the 1970s – 1980s] (kyiv, 1993); Marie‑Pierre rey, “Le Département international du Comité central du PCuS, le MiD et la politique extérieure soviétique de 1953 à 1991,” communisme 74/75 (2003): 179–215; Piotr Cherkasov, iMeMO. institut Mirovoi ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii. Portret na fone epokhi [iMeMO, The institute of World economy and international relations. Portrait on Background of the epoch] (M., 2004); Vladislav Zubok, “Sowjetische Westexperten,” in Bernd greiner, Tim Müller, Claudia Weber, eds., macht und Geist im kalten krieg (hamburg, 2011), 108–135.
12. “Doklad akademika N.N. Bolkhovitinova,” novaia i noveishaia istoria, 2003, No. 6, 185; “Yubilei i.A. Beliavskoi [The Anniversary of i. A. Beliavskaia],” Amerikanskii ezhegodnik [The American Year Book] [hereafter – Ae] 1995 (M., 1996), 13, 15.  in 1970 the sector began publishing its periodical Amerikanskii ezhegodnik.
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direct connections to this organization. the second Soviet center of the American 
studies was created in May 1967 as a special institute of the uSA at the uSSr 
Academy of Science (it was re‑named in 1975 as the institute of the uSA and Canada 
[hereafter – iSkAN]) under the leadership of georgii Arbatov.13 Many prominent 
Soviet experts in uS economy and politics, including Nikolai inozemtsev, the irst 
Soviet expert in American contemporary economic history, were employed by 
iMeMO (Moscow’s institute of World economy and international relations, the 
uSSr Academy of Sciences), the old center of the Soviet economic theory, closed 
by Stalin in 1949 and re‑opened during the khrushchev’s thaw.14 
in 1958 the Soviet government permitted the irst exchange of Soviet students 
and scholars with the united States.15 Till 1968 the major American organization, 
which administered the scholarly exchanges with the Soviets, was called the 
inter‑university Committee on Travel grants (iuCTg). in 1968 it was replaced 
by the international research and exchanges Board (ireX), an organization 
established at the request of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) 
and the Social Science research Council (SSrC) to administer academic exchanges 
with the Soviet union and eastern europe. ireX conducted the exchange programs 
together with the uSSr Ministry of higher and Specialized Secondary education, 
and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.16 According to these programs, after 1968, 
40 Soviet graduate students or young faculty spent one or two semesters in the 
uSA each year, and 10 or more Soviet professors conducted research for periods 
of two to ive months each year. Although the overwhelming majority of Soviet 
students and professors, who participated in academic exchanges, represented 
sciences or engineering, ireX tried to involve Soviet experts in the humanities 
and social sciences in its programs as well. As a result, ireX supervised a special 
13. See various editions of the memoirs, written by the first director of this institute: g.A.  Arbatov, Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie (1953‑1985 gg.) Svidetel´stvo sovremennika [The Delayed recovery, 1953‑1985. The Testimony of Contemporary] (M., 1991), 381‑399; georgii Arbatov, Chelovek sistemy: Nabliudenia i razmyshlenia ochevidtsa eio raspada [Man of the System: Observations and reflections of the Contemporary of its Dissolution] (M., 2002), 132‑147, and a chapter “The institute: how We ‘Discovered’ America” in english 
in his, The System, 295‑328. iSkAN had its own monthly magazine SShA: ekonomica, 
politika, ideologiia. [The uSA: economy, Politics, ideology].
14. See how Arbatov described a role of a revived iMeMO: Arbatov, Zatianuvsheiesia vyzdorovlenie, 73‑74. Compare with Cherkasov, imemO, 81‑138, 139‑200, 201‑286.
15. See especially “Soglashenie mezhdu SSSr i SShA ob obmenakh v oblasti kul´tury, tekhniki i obrazovania [An Agreement between the uSSr and the uSA about the exchanges in the 
Fields of culture, technics and education],” Pravda, 1958, January 29, no. 29, p. 6. See about this and following u.S.‑uSSr exchanges agreements in the books of those who organized these exchanges from the uS side: robert F. Byrnes, Soviet‑American Academic exchanges, 1958‑1975 (Bloomington, iN, 1976), 46‑47, 48ff., and Yale richmond, u.S.‑Soviet Cultural exchanges, 1958‑1986 (Boulder, CO,1987), 2, 4ff. Compare with the russian publications, especially A.S.  krymskaia, “k istorii nauchno‑obrazovatel´nykh obmenov mezhdu SSSr i SShA v kontse 1950‑kh – 1960‑e gg. [About a history of the Scietific and educational exchanges between the uSSr and the uSA at the end of  the 1950s – 1960s],” noveishaia 
istoriia Rossii, 2011, No. 2, 99‑106.
16. See about this in Byrnes, Soviet‑American Academic exchanges, and. engerman, know Your enemy, 139, 171, 246‑248.
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program of collaborative research, conferences and workshops between ACLS 
and the Soviet Academy under the bilateral Commission on the Social Sciences 
and humanities, established in 1975. According to an administrator of these 
programs, about 80 Americans and 80 Soviets were
exchanged each year under the Commission’s activities, usually for visits of about one week. Between 1958 and the end of 1985, some 2,000 Americans and 2,000 Soviets were exchanged under iuCTg and ireX programs.17 
The dynamics and frequency of the visits to the united States dramatically 
changed during the Brezhnev era, especially in the period of détente of the 1970s. 
As contemporaries observed: 
in 1961‑62 we usually knew only one or two rare fortunate candidates from either Moscow university or the Academy of Sciences who visited America; by the end of the 1960s we had known at least ive names among our colleagues not only from Moscow but also from Leningrad who traveled on a regular basis to the States; but after 1974 it was already common practice to send our Americanists from all over the Soviet union, hundreds of them, – to the united 
States and canada.18 
 “Yes, it is true,” conirmed the ukrainian Americanist Arnold Shlepakov, “thanks 
to détente in the 1970s the irst ukrainian scholars went to America.”19 more 
visits (almost 600!) of Soviet Americanists were made during the Brezhnev era, 
especially during the détente period. One of these Soviet visiting scholars based 
at Columbia university, Aleksei Burmistenko, a young historian of American 
journalism from Moscow, even called numerous Soviet academic guests in the 
uSA “the children of détente” in 1977.20
During the Brezhnev’s détente in the 1970s the new centers for American 
studies were organized at the Department of history of Moscow State university 
(hereafter, – Mgu), in Leningrad and other industrial cities of the Soviet union. 
According to the Soviet government’s decision in 1973‑74, the Mgu department 
of history became a center for an establishment of Fulbright program in the uSSr. 
in 1975, Nikolai Sivachev, from the same department, established the Scholarly 
Coordinating Council on American Studies at this university. in November 1978, 
under his leadership, a new Soviet center for American studies was organized there, 
17. richmond, u.S.‑Soviet Cultural exchanges, 1958‑1986, 32.
18. interview with robert F. ivanov, Moscow, June 25, 1991.
19. interview with Arnold Shlepakov, kyiv, ukraine, April 28, 1990.
20. Library of Congress. Archival Manuscript Collection. international research and exchanges Board (ireX) [hereafter – LC. ireX]. rC 19 (1976‑77), F 7; The Milwaukee Journal, February 21, 1977. An essay about Burmistenko’s visit (“Soviet Critic Finds uS Press ruthless”) in this local newspaper quoted him, calling himself “i am a child of détente.” Compare with english, russia and idea of the West, 125.
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a so‑called “laboratory of American studies” afiliated with a department of modern 
and contemporary history.21
in kyiv, the capital of the Soviet ukraine, under the leadership of ukrainian 
scholar Arnold Shlepakov, a department of modern and contemporary history at the 
institute of history of the ukrainian Academy of Science was transformed into a new 
Soviet center of American studies during 1969‑1978. in 1978, this center overgrew 
its small department and became a new institute of the ukrainian Academy: – 
the institute of Social and economic Problems of the Foreign Countries.22 in 
November‑December 1971, during the irst All‑union symposium of the Soviet 
Americanists, 10 of 130 experts in uS history were from ukrainian institutions. 
By 1980, Shlepakov’s center for American studies in kyiv united 15 specialists in 
uS history, politics and diplomacy. ukrainian historian Semyion Appatov at Odesa 
university prepared at least 10 experts in contemporary uS history and diplomacy. 
At the same time, more than 20 experts in uS history (including graduate students) 
worked at the institute of the World history. By 1980, ten doctors of historical 
science, who were specialists in uS history, were employed there. An overwhelming 
majority of these historians were oficially afiliated with this institute’s sector of 
history of the uSA and Canada. By the beginning of the 1980s, this sector had 
20 members, and a few Americanists were afiliated with other sectors of the same 
institute.23 eleven specialists in the uS political history worked under leadership 
of Sivachev at the laboratory of American studies at the Department of history of 
Mgu. By 1976 the staff of iSkAN had grown to about 300 and by 1980 to more 
than 450. About half of these were researchers and half were support staff. every 
year this institute accepted approximately 15‑20 new postgraduate students. By the 
late 1970s, the staff of iMeMO numbered about 800, and at least 200 were experts 
in American studies. From 1964 until the end of the 1970s almost ifty experts in 
uS history had been awarded with a rank of doctor of historical science. in 1991, 
21. A.A.  Porshakova, “Laboratoria istorii SShA v Mgu [Laboratory of the uS history in Mgu],” Ae. 1989, 256‑265. in 1983 after Sivachev’s death, evgenii F. Yaz´kov became a leader of this center. See also Yu.N. rogulev, “Dvenadtsat´ let vzaimovygodnogo sotrudnichestva (o professional´nykh sviaziakh istorikov‑amerikanistov Mgu s amerikanskimi kollegami) [Twelve Years of Mutaully Benificial Cooperation (About Professional relations between Mgu historians‑Americanists and American Colleagues)] Ae. 1986, 246‑250. Compare with A.S.  Manykin, ed., Pamiati professora N.V. Sivacheva. SShA: evoliutsia osnovnykh ideino‑politicheskikh kontseptsii, [in Memory of Professor N.V.  Sivachev. The uSA: An evolution of the Main ideological and Political Concepts] (M., 2004), see esp. 5‑16.
22. Leonid Leshchenko and ihor Chernikov, “Vsesvitnio vidomyi vitchyznianyi uchenyi: istoryk‑miznarodnyk, organizator nauky i diplomat. Do 80‑litia vid dnia narodzhennia akademika NAN ukrainy Arnol´da Mykolaivycha Shlepakova (1930‑1996 rr.) [internationally Famous ukrainian Scholar: A historian‑ expert in international relations, Organizer of historical Scholarship and Diplomat. Celebrating 80‑years Anniversary of the Academician of NAN of ukraine, Arnold Mykolaievych Shlepakov (1930‑1996)],” in S.V. Vidnians´kyi, 
ed., Mizhnarodni zv´iazky ukrainy: naukovi poshuky i znakhidky [the international Relations of ukraine: Scholarly research and Findings] Vypusk 19, (kyiv: institut istorii NAN ukrainy, 2010), 27‑28. A majority of scholars affiliated with this institute studied various problems of uS and Canadian politics.
23. Ae. 1972, 303‑306, interviews with Shlepakov and with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, May 21, 2001.
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according to calculations of late e. Yaz´kov, at least 300 Soviet historians (all of 
them from russia and ukraine) studied uS history. Technically speaking, more 
than half, 250 of the 400 Americanists at iSkAN in 1980 held degrees of either 
kandidat or doctor of historical science; even those who studied uS contemporary 
politics were historians by training. At the end of the 1980s, almost 70% of all 
1,000 prominent Soviet Americanists (including political scientists, economists, 
sociologists, philosophers, literary and ilm critics) were college professors who 
taught American studies in major universities of Soviet russia and ukraine, in big 
industrial cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, kyiv, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. 
More than 60% of the Soviet Americanists employed by universities and colleges 
were located in russia, ‑ and almost 40% in ukraine. By 1991 it was the largest 
community of professional Americanists in the world outside the united States. 
The Chinese Americanists, the so‑called America Watchers, comprised the 
second largest, — after the Soviet community of America’s experts, with almost 
700 specialists concentrating in 15 college centers.24 
Soviet Preparation for Academic exchange
From the beginning of the Soviet‑uS cultural exchange of 1958 until the peak 
of perestroika, the Soviet side followed the same practices of selection of the 
Soviet participants. With a very few exceptions, all Soviet representatives in these 
exchange programs were members of communist party. They were cleared by 
the kgB and agreed to collaborate with the Soviet secret police. Some of these 
representatives were the “undercover” kgB oficers. As a rule, the overwhelming 
majority of the Soviet visitors were experts in engineering and science, only few of 
them were historians or represented humanities. even during the peak of academic 
exchange in 1977 among 40 Soviet nominations (for research trip to the united 
States) only three specialized in the humanities: all others were scientists.25 
Oficially, Soviet scholars went to America with the major goal to do their 
research and in some cases to teach, or deliver their lectures to American audiences. 
But to achieve this goal they had to follow a long, boring and humiliating process 
of application “for traveling abroad” and “thorough interviews” with so‑called 
“international departments” (mezhdunarodnye [Osobye]otdely) of their colleges 
and research institutions. The Soviet applicants who planned to travel to America 
had to be 1) “members of communist party, [this was especially required for 
24. Calculations were made according to data from gordon S. Wood and Louise g. Wood, 
eds., russian‑American Dialogue on the American revolution (Columbia, 1995), 7; Barbara L. Dash, A Defector reports: The institute of the uSA and Canada (Falls Church, VA, 1982), 7; Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, SShA: Problemy istorii i sovremennaia istoriografia [the uSA: Problems of history and recent historiography] (M., 1980), 340; my interview with Bolkhovitinov, May 21, 2001, and with Shlepakov. See also David Shambaugh, Beautiful imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972‑1990 (Princeton, 1991), 277‑278.
25. LC. ireX. rC 19 (1976‑77), F 39.
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historians and social scientists],” 2) approved by their employers (“with a research 
plan and an oficial recommendation, discussed by the department irst, and then 
signed by their department chair, but also by the communist party and trade union 
chiefs”)26, 3) recommended for “the research travel abroad by their departments 
to the uSSr Ministry of higher education and the international department,” 
and, inally, 4) cleared by the kgB through the above‑mentioned international 
departments, promising to submit their reports to the kgB oficers immediately 
after their return from America. After this approval the names of Soviet candidates 
were sent to American organizations (like ireX, ACLS, Fulbright, etc.), which 
usually approved all Soviet candidates.27 
Paradoxically, two communist “founding fathers” of American studies in the 
uSSr, Aleksei eimov and Lev Zubok, who taught (after the Second World War) 
the most popular undergraduate courses on uS history at the Moscow State institute 
of international relations (hereafter, – MgiMO) for their future Americanists 
students, were never cleared by the kgB and were not allowed to go abroad 
because of their background. As it turned out, Aleksei eimov, a former russian 
naval oficer and representative of the russian Orthodox nobility, who published 
Soviet pioneering studies on the early American history, speciically about the 
genesis of American capitalism through the Civil War and the reconstruction, and 
also the irst Soviet standard textbook on modern history for secondary schools, 
was connected to “the whites” during the russian Civil War and participated in 
counter‑revolutionary activities in 1918‑1920. Lev Zubok, a Jewish communist, the 
author of the irst Soviet studies on the history of uS working class and the history 
of uS diplomacy at the beginning of the twentieth century, came to russia after the 
civil war in 1924 from Philadelphia as a representative of the American communist 
movement. unfortunately, he became a victim of anti‑cosmopolitan, anti‑Semitic 
campaigns during 1948‑49. As a result of these “ideological sins,” the kgB denied 
the numerous applications for international travel by eimov and Zubok during the 
1960s.28 Meanwhile their former MgiMO students, such young Americanists as 
Arbatov, Bolkhovitinov and ivanov, were communists without “any ideological 
deviations,” and they were cleared by the kgB for their travels in America. 
26. Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 1009, l. 13.
27. Citations are from Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 1009, l. 13‑14, and Vospominaniia, 48‑49. See also my interviews with former Soviet Americanists ‑ Bolkhovitinov, Fursenko, ivanov, Shlepakov and Leshchenko, and the American organizers of their visits – Yale richmond and Donald raleigh. Soviet side usually rejected more American candidates, then uS hosting institutions. The most infamous cases of Soviet rejection were the denial of David goldfrank’s (because of his religious topic) and Frank Sysin’s (because of his ukrainian nationalism) applications.
28. See B. kozenko, “Lev izraelevich Zubok (1896‑1967),” in g. Sevostianov, L. Marinovich, L. Mil´skaya, eds., Portrety istorikov: Vremia i sud´by. Vol. 2 (M., 2000), 359‑368; r. ivanov, “Aleksei Vladimirovich efimov (1896‑1971),” ibid., 369‑381. i described in detail the story of Zubok and efimov in my article: Sergei i. Zhuk, “inventing America on the Borders of Socialist imagination: Movies and Music from the uSA and the Origins of American Studies in the uSSr,” regiON: regional Studies of russia, eastern europe, and Central Asia, 2013, 2(2): 249‑288.
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The kgB usually approved the “clean” candidates’ research plans and itineraries 
(with the names of schools, library and archival collections in the united States.) 
Only after this approval could these candidates apply for foreign passports. 
The kgB oficers from the international departments through the uSSr Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs helped to get uS visas and air tickets for the selected and 
approved candidates.29 The most important requirement for all travelers abroad was 
the submission of a special travel report to the international departments (for the 
kgB). Besides a traditional academic report to the department chair, all visitors 
to foreign countries reported immediately to the kgB oficers of their institutes 
(or universities) in a month after their return. This practice of collecting reports 
ended in Moscow only during perestroika in 1987, while in provincial universities 
in ukraine, the local international departments still requested the inal travel reports 
even in 1993.30 
Some Soviet candidates, being already approved by their departments for 
research travel, were rejected by the kgB, for their old “ideological crimes.” 
Another famous Americanist, Nikolai Yakovlev, a former student of eimov and 
Zubok, the popular author of the Soviet biography of the irst American president 
george Washington, was denied the privilege to travel abroad several times during 
the 1970s and the 1980s. As it turned out, during the late 1940s, Yakovlev was 
arrested together with his famous father, a Soviet marshal of artillery. eventually 
Yakovlev was rehabilitated by the Soviet police, and he returned to academic work 
and joined the “American” sector at the institute of history. unfortunately for his 
academic career, the kgB began using him for their provocations, engaged him in 
writing books, glorifying the kgB struggle “with various anti‑Soviet intellectuals 
like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.”31 Despite this collaboration with the kgB, 
Yakovlev still was not allowed to travel abroad.
 A younger colleague of Sevostianov and Bolkhovitinov from iVi, Sergei Burin, 
who was a grandson of the Soviet historian‑medievalist S.D. Skazkin, and studied a 
29. As Fursenko and Leshchenko recalled later, “before a travel to America, the number one ideological enemy of the Soviet union, it was a normal practice to interview the selected candidate by the kgB representative at the candidate’s teaching or academic institution to remind him about some behavioral moments in the country of our enemies. Only after this prophylactic conversation, a kgB officer could offer to this selected candidate a contract for the future collaboration with the kgB. it was the candidate’s right to accept or ignore this offer.” Both Fursenko in 1991 and Leshchenko in 2013 used the same phrases.
30. See my e‑mail correspondence with Vladislav Zubok, June 9, 2013. he recalled that during his first travel to uS in 1987, iSkAN’s administration stopped collecting travel reports. But i still remember that before and after my 1993 research trip to the uSA, i was approached by the local former kgB officer, requesting a submission of my academic report to his office at Dnipropetrovsk State university.
31. See about a kgB’s treatment of young Yakovlev, when the Soviet police used him in their provocation against uS embassy in Moscow in 1949 in John Lewis gaddis, george F. kennan: 
An American Life (New York, 2011), 456‑458. Compare with a very idealistic biography of Yakovlev in the essay by V. Pechatnov and S. Pozharskaia, “Nikolai Nikolaievich Yakovlev (1927‑1996),” in Sevostianov, ed., Portrety istorikov: vremia i sud´by, Vol. 4, 522‑533. i quote his book commissioned by the kgB: Nikolai N. Yakovlev, Tsru protiv SSSr [ciA against the uSSr] (M., 1976), 7.
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social history of colonial Virginia and Maryland, also became nevyezdnoi (without 
privilege to travel abroad). Being a Mgu undergraduate student in the late 1960s, 
he used to draw various funny caricatures of the Soviet leaders such as Vladimir 
Lenin in his note book during the lectures. Once, by mistake, Burin left a page 
with his caricature picture of Lenin inside a book from the Mgu library. A Mgu 
librarian found this picture in the book, which Burin had just returned, and she 
immediately reported to the kgB about this. Burin was arrested, expelled from 
Mgu and komsomol. Only interference of his famous grandfather, academician 
Skazkin, saved Burin from the prison term. he was drafted into the Soviet army and 
only in the 1970s did he resume his academic career. After this experience, he was 
never allowed to travel abroad.32 
Scholars from the Soviet provincial centers for American studies also had 
restrictions for their travels to America because of the limitations in the centralized 
distribution of the vacancies for obtaining American travel grants. Since 1958, 
usually the irst positions in the oficial “travel lists to America” (raznoriadka na 
poezdku v Ameriku) by the uSSr Ministry of higher education and Academy 
of Sciences had been sent to the representatives of Moscow. Arnold Shlepakov, 
a ukrainian historian of the working class immigration to the united States, 
applied for a permission to travel to America many times during 1962‑64. Only 
in October of 1964, did he inally receive this permission. Meanwhile, during the 
same time, Muscovites from various Moscow centers for American studies, such 
as Sivachev, were included in the irst positions in the “vacancy list” immediately 
after the kgB clearance.33 this “discrimination” of provincial scholars continued 
through the 1970s. By 1980, nine from ten doctors of historical science, who were 
experts in uS history at Moscow’s institute of World history, had already visited 
the united States, while in ukraine during the same period of time, only three 
from six professors of uS history at “Shlepakov’s institute” in kiev were invited 
to participate in academic exchange with Americans. Overall, according to ireX 
iles, from 1968 to 1980 almost 80 percent (479) Soviet visitors to America came 
from Moscow, and all of them, except four, were men. Among 50 Soviet candidates 
for the trip to the uSA in 1982, 38 (more than 70 percent) came from families of 
the Soviet party and academic elite (like Bolkhovitinov, Shlepakov and Vlasova).34 
Another serious moral problem facing Soviet Americanists was collaboration 
with the kgB. usually after the irst travel abroad and submission of their 
travel reports, Soviet scholars were invited by the kgB oficers for a “special 
conversation.” As some participants of these conversations recalled, Soviet 
32. interview with Bolkhovitinov, May 21, 2001, and interview with Sergei Burin, September 3, 1998, Moscow. Compare with Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 1009, l. 91‑94.
33. See archival documents about these submissions in Arkhiv NAN ukrainy, Opys 1‑L, Otdel kadrov, [hereafter, – ANANu] sprava 1277, l. 54 (Shlepakov’s papers), and Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 1009, l. 14 (Sivachev’s papers).
34. Bolkhovitinov, SShA: Problemy, 339‑340, and interviews with ivanov, Bolkhovitinov, and especially with Leonid Leshchenko, June 26, 2013, kyiv. in the files, i found the names of only four female Soviet visitors such as irina Beliavskaia and Marina Vlasova from Moscow.
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Americanists had to play “various mind games” and follow their “strategies of 
survival” during these conversations accepting some kgB offers and rejecting 
others. The major goal of these games was to maintain good connections with 
the kgB to guarantee the future trips to America. Not everybody could follow 
the rules of such games. Breaking these rules could affect one’s entire academic 
career and, especially, plans for travel abroad.35 the most important part of the 
“strategies of survival” was a correct adherence to all ideological requirements 
in the travel report by the scholar. This report had to relect the major research 
and teaching goals of the travel and describe the major research centers, personal 
and scholarly contacts abroad, and main activities during the travel. The 
kgB reports also required a certain description of the political, economic and 
ideological (and since the 1970s cultural) situation in American society. Trying 
to ignore these rules was considered to be a serious “deviation.”36  
A typical case of such “deviation” from the “strategies of survival” was the story 
of Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, who joined communist party only in 1961, visited the 
uSA for the irst time in his life later than all his colleagues, from February through 
August of 1968, when he had already published two highly acclaimed books in 
the uS history about the Monroe Doctrine and a “cultural diplomacy” of early 
American republic and imperial russia, based on the original documents from 
the Soviet archives. unfortunately for Bolkhovitinov’s academic career at iVi, in 
1968 he rejected a kgB recruiting offer. As he recalled later, before his irst travel 
to the uSA, in his interview during January of 1968, a kgB oficer had already 
mentioned to Bolkhovitinov the possibility for future collaboration. Bolkhovitinov 
pretended that he did not understand a nature of this offer, and after his return in 
Moscow in September 1968, he “forgot” to submit his report to “this kgB oficer,” 
reporting directly to the institute’s international ofice instead.37 
As a result of this strategic mistake, the kgB denied Bolkhovitinov’s access 
to any long‑term research grants funded by the uS government, and grigorii 
Sevostianov, who represented the kgB control in iVi, and who was Bolkhovitinov’s 
supervisor, never allowed Bolkhovitinov to visit America longer than one month 
during the 1970s. Moreover, during his short trip to Alaska to a conference about 
history of russian America in 1979, one of the Soviet visitors, A.N. Martynov, an 
oficial of the uSSr National Committee of historians, denounced Bolkhovitinov 
35. i use phrases from my interview with Marina Vlasova and Aleksandr Fursenko, March 19, 1991, Moscow. See also Nekrich’s memoirs about travels abroad of Soviet Americanists from his institute of history, and especially about the case of Lev Slezkine, who was denied to travel abroad: Aleksandr Nekrich, Forsake Fear: Memoirs of an historian, (Boston, 1991), 135, 201. even the people who were close to the kgB, like Arbatov, had problematic relations with this organization, and sometimes experienced real persecution by the kgB officers. See Arbatov, Zatianuvsheiesia vyzdorovlenie, 269, 272‑274.
36. See a typical academic travel report by O.S. Soroko‑Tsiupa, a Mgu Professor of Canadian history, in Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 1011, l. 11‑12, about his travel to Toronto, Canada during September 1966 – June 1967. Compare with ANANu, sprava 1277, l. 53‑54, 64, and sprava 1198, l. 31‑34.
37. Bolkhovitinov, Vospominaniia, 47‑48.
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to the kgB as “an intellectual with anti‑Soviet feelings” who had “unsanctioned 
secret meetings with American scholars.”38 As a direct result of this denunciation, 
Bolkhovitinov was not allowed to travel abroad until perestroika, when he went to 
the uSA in late 1986. A few talented Soviet Americanists, like Bolkhovitinov or 
his young colleague from Odesa Vitaly L. Beloborodko, who rejected the recruiting 
efforts of the kgB, were punished by a ban to travel abroad.39 those Soviet 
Americanists, who were kgB oficers, like Sevostianov, or who collaborated with 
this organization had no problems with getting permission for their international 
travels from the kgB.
American hosts about Soviet guests
The “adventures” of the Soviet Americanists in America were closely covered 
by the uS organizations, responsible for the reception of the Soviet guests. After 
many months of waiting for the kgB approval, and being closely monitored by 
this organization at home, Soviet Americanists inally arrived in America and 
became a focus of close attention by the oficials from ireX and other agencies, 
including the uS Department of State. According to ireX iles, 480 (80 percent) 
Soviet participants in academic exchanges program during 1968‑1982, who 
represented the ield of “American studies,” were oficial policy analysts of the 
Soviet government, and all of them came from the research institutes of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, such as iSkAN and iMeMO in Moscow. During the same 
period of time, almost 80 percent (483) of Soviet Americanists who visited the 
united States, using American research grants, were various oficial leaders 
(mostly academic apparatchiks) from the Soviet centers for American studies in 
Mgu, iSkAN, iMeMO and iVi. relecting an obvious Cold War ideological bias, 
American observers were skeptical about the mission of these research centers, and 
characterized them in the ireX oficial reports as the “Spy institutes.”40 
Soviet oficials expressed a similar skeptic and suspicious attitude toward 
Americans at the beginning of these contacts. As iSkAN director georgii Arbatov 
wrote in his memoirs, a “majority of our specialists [in American studies]” had 
yet to overcome “pervasive ideology … [of] propaganda and fear.” Speaking for 
himself he recalled that, when named in 1967 the head of the uSA institute, 
38. ibid., 47‑48, 50, 53.
39. LC. ireX. rC 94, F 28, file of Vitaly Beloborodko.
40. LC. ireX. rC 237, F 13 (1977). See an ireX paper dated of September 20, 1977, with hand‑written description of iSkAN as “a Spy institute.” As David godfrank from georgetown university recalled, the entire situation with Soviet‑American exchanges reminded him of the “radio erevan” joke he heard “about 35 years ago.” “Vopros: Are our academic exchanges with the united States reciprocal and equitable? Otvet: Yes, our academic exchanges with the united States are reciprocal and equitable. They send us scholars, and we treat them like spies; we send them spies, and they treat them like scholars.” Cited from goldfrank’s e‑mail message to me, August 29, 2013.
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[my] knowledge was insuficiently deep […] i had never been to the united States. i had no  contacts or acquaintances among Americans […] [but] harder to acquire than acquaintances […] was a feeling for the country, a partly rational, partly intuitive sense that we could only acquire through regular professional contact with a wide variety of specialists from the united States and with representatives from government and business.41  
American hosts, experts in russian and Soviet studies, were always interested 
in collaboration with the Soviet scholars, trying to help them to integrate into 
the “improvised international community, created by the open opportunities of 
détente.”42 Sometime the American hosts even tried to ignore the “spy” background 
of their Soviet visitors, if they were oficial bosses from Moscow centers. American 
scholars lattered these guests in public, hoping to get oficial invitations to visit 
russia or begin collaborative research projects with their Soviet visitors. Among 
various materials, some ireX iles contain a very positive and sympathetic portrayal 
of grigorii Sevostianov, a professional Soviet spy and intelligence/kgB oficer, 
who during WWii conducted Soviet espionage in the Far east.43 Through his kgB 
connections, Sevostianov became the head of the irst American studies center in 
Moscow in 1968, “trying to suppress any fresh idea” among his Soviet colleagues, 
punishing those “liberals” like Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, “for an expression of their 
open‑minded and too revisionist views on uS history” in Moscow. As the head 
of this center, he became a popular Soviet guest in America. Paradoxically, this 
“kgB man,” and well‑known “enemy of American imperialism,” known for 
his “offensive brutal anti‑American” publications in the uSSr, based mainly on 
41. g. Arbatov, The System, 289‑290, 292. Arbatov explained that as late as 1968 even he, director of the new uSA institute, still had not a single American acquaintance because “given 
the restrictions of the times […] i didn’t even have the right to initiate such contacts.” See also 
english, russia and idea of the West, 148. 
42. Two colleagues from the Department of history at the Johns hopkins university, who represented fields of russian history (Jeffrey Brooks) and uS history (Jack P.  greene) expressed similar thoughts almost at the same time, in April 1999 during a conversation with me. Alfred rieber (in 1998‑99) confirmed this as well. As Norman Saul mentioned earlier, in 1975, “academic détente was part of [Soviet Americanists’] mission to this country.” See in LC. ireX. rC 228, F 18, p. 2.
43. See his publication where he describes his career in the Far east: g.P.  Sevostianov, ekspansionistskaia politika SShA na Dal´nem Vostoke, v kitaie, i koree v 1905‑1911  gg. [The uS expansionist Politics in Far east, China and korea during 1905‑1911] (M., 1958). After this book, he stopped writing something original. But as head of “American” sector since 1967, he had mainly been editing the collective works of his sector’s colleagues. See an official Soviet publication, openly praising the professional background of Sevostianov as a Soviet spy/kgB intelligence officer before his academic career in 1950. it was published in the rubric 
“nauchnaia zhizn´ [Scholarly Life]” in Amerikanskii ezhegodnik during perestroika. See S.N. Burin, “k 75‑letiiu akademika g.N. Sevostianova,” [Celebrating 75‑years Anniversary of the Academician g.N. Sevostianov] Ae 1990 (M., 1991), 211‑215. After his “spy career,” in 1947 Sevostianov was sent by the kgB to the high Diplomatic School of the uSSr Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he graduated with a freshly written kandidatskaia dissertation. he defended this dissertation in 1950, when he was recommended by the kgB to be hired by the institute of history. in 1960 he defended his doctoral dissertation and was appointed in September of 1967 as an acting head of the sector of history of the uSA and Canada of the same institute. in April of 1969 Sevostianov was officially approved as a chair of this sector. 
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communist propagandist clichés rather than on serious analysis of historical 
documents, suddenly, was introduced by American hosts in 1974 as “a distinguished 
russian diplomatic historian” and as “a scholar of excellent background, a man of 
great integrity and seriousness.” Many American colleagues of Sevostianov, such 
as Norman Saul from the university of kansas, characterized Sevostianov as “a 
serious scholar” who “was well versed in American published material relating to 
his topic, thus enabling him to use research time more proitably.”44 As it turned 
out, Professor Saul was interested in the Sevostianov’s immediate support for 
“expanding scholarly cooperation directly between the university of kansas and 
the [Soviet] Academy of Sciences,” and “the possibility of joint conferences, joint 
publications, and teaching and research exchanges.”45 
All American visitors to the uSSr, especially the American experts in russian/
Soviet history, culture and politics, depended on the good relations with the Soviet 
oficials from the “spy institutes,” and eventually, on their oficial invitations to 
visit Moscow. That is why the ireX oficials always supported and promoted 
the visits of such famous Soviet academic oficials, connected to the kgB, like 
Sevostianov, or georgii Arbatov. it was the principle of “do ut des” – “we give you 
our permission to visit the uSA and expect you allowing us to visit the uSSr to 
do our research there,” or “we do not pay attention to your kgB and Communist 
connections, and expect (instead) that you would invite us to the Soviet union any 
time we need it.”46 
On August 27, 1973, ireX issued a special “Memorandum about Bilateral 
Travel grant request” to sponsor Arbatov’s to visit on January 9 through February 
6, 1974: 
The uS institute (iSkAN) has served as a useful intermediary in channeling visiting uS scholars to other institutes within (Soviet) Academy hierarchy, but these visits have to date not provided satisfactory reciprocal opportunities for ‘”russianists” and Soviet specialists. We should like to discuss with Arbatov an expansion of our range of contacts and the formation of a bi‑national agenda commission which would identify areas of mutual and parallel interest in order to facilitate consultation and collaboration.47
44. LC. ireX. rC 21, F 17 (1974‑75), and LC. ireX. rC 228, F 18, citation from a letter by Allen kassof, December 26, 1974. Compare with my interviews with Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, robert ivanov, Aleksandr Fursenko and Aaron Ya. gurevich (March 19, 1991) and their very negative relations to the “kgB general” Sevostianov; they characterized Sevostianov as “the worst enemy of American people,” as the “Soviet hawk of the Cold War.”
45. LC. ireX. rC 228, F 18, p. 2: “After consultations with faculty and administration and subsequent conversations with Dr. Sevostianov in Washington by myself […], it was decided to extend a proposal for a joint Soviet‑American conference on World War ii to be held in Lawrence in the fall of 1976, including a joint publication of papers. The State Department and American historical Association were also consulted in regard to this project, which was presented to Dr. Sevostianov by Professor John T. Alexander in Moscow in May…”
46. These phrases were mentioned by Vlasova, compare with interview with Donald raleigh, May 16, 2012.
47. LC. ireX. rC 161, F 25, ireX Memorandum, August 27, 1973, and letter of Cynthia Scott, February 26, 1974.
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As a result, on September 13, 1973, Allen kassof from ireX wrote Arbatov an oficial 
invitation from ireX and ACLS to visit the uSA with his wife, and to deliver a special 
public lecture (with a promised honorarium) at the university of Michigan, in Ann 
Arbor. After this successful visit on February 26, 1974, Cynthia Scott, ireX program 
oficer, in her letter to Arbatov, reminded him about the successful results of his 
application for American funding for his trips, promised to support all his future visits 
to America and at the same time promised to bring in Moscow the list with nominations 
of American scholars for 1974‑1975 academic year, and asked for a meeting with him 
in iSkAN to discuss this list of the future American visitors in the uSSr.48
The general evaluations of the visits by Soviet Americanists to the uSA and 
discussions about pro and contra of this exchanges program were the major themes 
of ireX correspondence during the 1970s. The main idea of these documents was 
to justify the rationale for the exchange with the Soviet scholars. in some reports 
ireX oficials were sincerely surprised with the rare cases of professionalism and 
academic honesty of Soviet Americanists.49 A good summary of the American hosts’ 
reaction to Soviet guests was expressed in a correspondence in 1976, by eugene 
B. Skolnikoff, Director of the Center for international Studies at Massachusetts 
institute of Technology (hereafter, – MiT), who wrote to Julia holm from ireX, 
[the Soviets] seemed to come with a very speciic objective of learning about certain techniques in political science, and were relatively little interested in discussing anything else at all. Moreover, i did not have the impression that they were well‑grounded in those techniques themselves, though i cannot speak with certainty on that point. The impression certainly was that they were there to get information rather than to have broader discussions. it was not clear to me either that they were suficiently well‑versed in the techniques they wanted to learn about to be able to assimilate very much of the information they seemed to be after… [p.2] i might add that my own recent experiences with russian visitors have been so consistently unsatisfactory, and i have picked up enough similar comments from others, that i ind myself increasingly less interested in receiving or meeting with russian visitors unless i know them well and know that i can have a reasonable exchange of information with them. When Dr. Arbatov visited MiT recently for a small luncheon, i made this point very strongly to him and indicated that from my perspective uS‑Soviet academic exchanges would deteriorate very rapidly if the russians continue to carry out their side as seems to have been developing in the last couple of years. he said he ‘got the message’ and would carry it back but offered no other commentary.50
A month later, Julia holm answered to Skolnikoff, explaining that 
[…] of seven letters i received back (about Soviet visitors), ive were positive. Those ive letters came from professors who do not frequently receive Soviet 
48. ibid.
49. LC. ireX. rC 187, F 13: Sergei Plekhanov’s file, praising his erudition.
50. LC. ireX. rC 228, F 45, letter by eugene B. Skolnikoff, June 22, 1976, pp. 1‑2.
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scholars and thus might have more patience and lower expectations than scholars like yourself who see a regular parade of Soviets. There is also a feeling in much of the correspondence that [academic apparatchiks] serve as laboratory specimens – “so this is how a shishka acts, talks, and dresses in the mid‑70’s…” – but not as intellectual counterparts… unfortunately the evaluations that came back this year [about Soviet vistors] were alarmingly poor – the majority of the Soviet scientists were quite obviously here as a reward and not to do research… i mention this because the problem of – let me be frank – hacks coming guised as scholars, plagues all three exchanges i run.51  
in general, American hosts were very skeptical about intellectual potential and 
scholarly contributions of the Soviet Americanists who visited their country. Till 
mid‑1970s they called these Soviet visits “a kind of academic tourism,” and they 
expected that more serious Soviet researchers eventually would come to visit as 
well. Overall they were not interested in Soviet Americanists coming to American 
universities. As one expert in east Asian Studies from harvard university 
complained to ireX in June of 1975: 
The Academy of Sciences of the uSSr has sent us a succession of people who ask questions, but have nothing to offer. They are not historians, but seem to be intelligence specialists, and are not of intellectual interest to us. Meanwhile, our proposal that an historian of interest to us should visit harvard from their institute of Oriental Culture of the Academy of Sciences has been bypassed and disregarded for three years past. if the Soviets expect intellectual interchange with us, they should send people competent for the purpose.52 
unfortunately, the majority of Soviet visitors were academic or college apparatchiks 
rather than serious researchers. ireX reports left many portrayals of such Soviet 
functionaries. All of them contain the similar characteristics: 
1. Bombastic, 2. Arrogant, 3. impolite (arrives without announcement to meet people), 4. Doesn’t pay hotel bill, 5. Doesn’t arrive for appointments made for him, 6. Speaking out of order, 7. rejected a [American host’s] complaint that information in data sheets was not correct, 8. rejected a complaint that Soviets ask for too much money, 9. rejected complaints that Soviets participants only learn, bring little of value to American universities.53 
51. LC. ireX. rC 228, F 45, letter by Julia holm, July 14, 1976, p. 1‑2. Another problem, which ireX officials began complaining after 1975 was the kgB trying to stop the serious researchers from going to the uSA: “Support for dissidents among American scientists is growing steadily and i am very curious to see if their actions might not positively affect the quality of scholars coming here.”
52. LC. ireX. rC 228, F 54, letter by John k. Fairbank, June 27, 1975. On May 12, 1975, ireX Memorandum recommended to finance (from 3‑4 weeks) visit of talented Soviet sociologist, “which would promise to lead us beyond the kind of academic tourism which [existed in early years].” See in LC. ireX. rC 161, F 29.
53. LC. ireX. rC 91, F 1 (1963‑68). See Folder: “Trip to uSA of P.i. Shitov, from Department of Foreign relations, Ministry of higher education, March (4‑27) 1968”. he went to visit 
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More than 60  percent of all ireX reports during the Brezhnev era had direct 
complaints about bad english language and research skills of Soviet students of 
American studies. usually American hosts could praise (in 40 percent of ireX 
iles) Soviet Americanists, specialists in uS economy, politics, diplomacy and 
culture from iSkAN and iMeMO, but very rarely Soviet historians,  whom they 
“found [sometime] charming people,” but [they] could not “see that visits [of 
Soviet historians] accomplished any intellectual purpose,” because Soviet guests 
“prosecuted no signiicant research here [in America].”54 even Aleksandr Fursenko, 
a Soviet historian, the most respected by his American colleagues, was criticized in 
the ireX reports for the same reason. Thus in his letter from November 15, 1979, 
Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. from the City university of New York, wrote to 
ireX, answering to an inquiry regarding the visit of Fursenko and his research 
topic about “evolution of uS politics in the 1970s,” and complained at the end, 
i have seen him on his previous trips and suppose i will see him again this time. But i cannot forbear passing on to you my strong impression that these meetings are a total waste of time. Fursenko, though a nice fellow, is not a historian. he is a Soviet propagandist, totally impervious to evidence at odds with his stereotypes, and it is a misuse of money to send him (or for that matter any other Soviet “historian” of contemporary affairs) around the united States.55
Despite their constant complaints about “the ideological bias” and “preconceived 
notions” of Soviet visitors, American hosts always emphasized the political and 
cultural signiicance of these exchanges. in January 24, 1975, Marshall Shulman 
from Columbia university in his letter to ireX positively evaluated visits of two 
scholars, Yuri Mel´nikov, a sector head at the institute of the international Workers’ 
Movement, uSSr Academy of Sciences and Vladimir Zolotukhin from iSkAN: 
i consider both visits to have been useful. As it happened, i met with both men in Moscow afterwards, and both expressed warm appreciation for their reception here, and said that the trip had been valuable for them. i have no doubt that their desire to reciprocate made my own trip more productive. i have known Dr. Mel´nikov for many years. he is a thoughtful man, and a serious scholar. he has made several trips to the united States, and they are relected in the differentiations he makes in his writings… Dr. Zolotukhin is the head of a section in the institute of the uSA, and he arranged for me to meet with members of his section in Moscow to discuss the role of the uS Congress in the determination of foreign policy. From the discussion, i derived some valuable insights into their perceptions of uS political life. The quality of his 
colleges and universities in the uSA where Soviet students stayed. See a special hand‑written note with the complaints about Shitov’s visit from ireX representatives.
54. LC. ireX. rC 21, F 68, letter by Donald Fleming from Charles Warren Center at harvard, April 6, 1976, about a visit by igor Dementiev. The similar unenthusiastic report about e. Yaz´kov’s visit is placed in the same folder under F 85. 
55. LC. ireX. rC 187, F 25, letter by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., New York, November 15, 1979.
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observations also relected the value of his experiences in the united States. it is my belief that it is in the united States interest to have Soviet analysts of the uS as knowledgeable as possible, to reduce the risk of dangerous miscalculations and unnecessary misunderstandings.56
According to the oficial American documents, the American hosts clearly 
understood the role of those Soviet Americanists from iSkAN, iMeMO and 
other Moscow and kiev centers, who were the Soviet policy analysts and the 
oficial advisers of the Soviet leadership. For ireX administration and the uS 
State Department, those Soviet “power people,” like Arbatov, were the “important 
connections” to the Soviet political leaders. During the 1970s, a majority of ireX 
exchanges, involving Soviet Americanists (almost 80 percent), funded the Soviet 
policy analysts with discussions of arms control, and other diplomatic issues in 
the uS‑Soviet relations. Moreover, ireX administration supported those Soviet 
research projects, which could provide Soviet leadership with precious information 
about the situation in uS politics, economy, society and culture, with the goal “to 
reduce the risk of Soviet dangerous miscalculations” in the “growing arms race.”57 
According to the Soviet policy analysts, who were active participants in ireX 
programs, they tried to bring this message of “their American hosts” to Leonid 
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. through their personal ties to leadership, 
Americanists from iMeMO and iSkAN gave Brezhnev realistic recommendations 
about careful and reasonable politics of reducing the risks of arms race. 
unfortunately, after 1979 “their efforts to convince Brezhnev [to listen to their 
analysis after their visits to America] came to naught due to the latter’s near‑total 
mental incapacity and the attendant devolution of power to Defense Minister Dmitri 
ustinov and the military.”58
A minority of Soviet Americanists (less than 20 percent), participants in ireX 
programs, were Soviet experts in uS history. American hosts also supported 
inancially this category of Soviet visitors. According to ireX reports, “this 
exchange of scholars, if it can be carried on more broadly, would be a great asset 
in building better [and closer cultural and intellectual] relations between the 
united States and russia.”59 iReX administration tried to support the research 
projects of the Soviet historians, but also their “academic connections” to their 
American colleagues, American experts in russian studies – “russianists” and 
“Sovietologists.” From a technical point of view, establishing of such connections 
was important for helping the Soviet visitors with their adjustment to American 
56. LC. ireX. rC 228, F 17, letter by Marshall Shulman, January 24, 1975. 
57. Look though the entire ireX file for the Year 1975 with recommendations to provide the Soviet analysts with all necessary information about uS economy. LC. ireX. rC 228, F 17. i quote a phrase “Soviet powerful people,” from my interview with late richard Stites, November 18, 2008, Philadelphia.
58. See Arbatov, The System, 202, and english, russia and idea of the West, 163‑164, 165.
59. LC. ireX. rC 31, F 26, p. 2.
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realities. American Sovietologists, who knew russian language and culture, became 
the irst natural “interpreters” of American life for the Soviet guests, experts in uS 
history. As a result, Soviet Americanists had more friendly relations with American 
Sovietologists than with the local uS historians.60 moreover, later on, the Soviet 
visitors became instrumental in obtaining the oficial invitations to the uSSr for 
their former American hosts. it was the oficial policy of ireX administration 
‑ “to encourage the involvement of both Soviet and American scholars in the 
international, mutually beneicial, academic projects.” This policy worked, and 
all Soviet Americanists, participants in the academic exchanges program, tried to 
“organize the oficial invitation for their former American hosts.”61 
Soviet “discursive” discoveries of America 
According to American documents, the most talented Soviet Americanists 
who spent major time of their visit working hard at the American libraries and 
archives were a few Soviet enthusiasts of uS history, politics and culture who 
came to the uSA already prepared for serious research work and “had already 
done their homework.”62 The American “experience” of these Soviet Americanists 
affected their entire academic career, shaping their research priorities, interests 
and discursive strategies in presenting material they discovered in the uSA for 
publication in the Soviet union. 
One of these Soviet Americanists was Nikolai Sivachev, a graduate student 
from Mgu’s department of history, who began his academic career as a participant 
of uS‑Soviet student exchanges program during 1961‑1962. The American 
administrators of this program noted that this Soviet student of uS history took 
classes at Columbia university, “through serious application, made even greater 
strides in english” and successfully studied the u.S. presidential election of 
1936 under a supervision of his adviser, Professor richard hofstadter.63 this 
experience triggered Sivachev’s interest in political history of the New Deal 
and social history of uS labor. under inluence of his advisor, a conservative 
American political historian, Sivachev concentrated on a history of the political 
elites in uS during the 1930s. When he returned to Moscow, he added Marxist 
analysis to his archival indings, defended his Soviet kandidatskaia dissertation, 
and prepared his study of political struggle during the uS elections in the 1930s, 
60. Both Sevostianov and Bolkhovitinov (from iVi) became close friends of the American expert in russian history, Norman Saul. Sivachev (from Mgu) became a friend of the American historian of Soviet russia Donald raleigh. Sivachev’s student, Vladimir Sogrin (from iVi), still is a good friend of Norman Saul and has close friendly connections with Alfred rieber, an American historian of imperial Russia.
61. interview with Yale richmond, May 9, 2012.
62. i use the phrase coined by Professor Alfred rieber from the university of Pennsylvania from: LC. ireX. rC 21, F 113, letter by Alfred rieber, May 31, 1972, p. 1.
63. LC. ireX. rC 68, F 36, p. 25.
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which was published as a book in 1966.64 during the same visit, using various 
American archival collections, Sivachev also collected the new material about the 
American working class movement during the New Deal reforms in 1933‑36. 
As early as September of 1964, he inished his new book manuscript, which was 
discussed and approved for publication by his colleagues from the Mgu department 
of modern and contemporary history.65 in October of 1966, using his American 
materials, Sivachev delivered a report to his colleagues about his new research 
project, which opened a completely new topic for Soviet historiography:  – “labor 
legislation in the uSA.” i. galkin, chair of the department, was so impressed by 
Sivachev’s report that he “immediately proposed to request a recommendation 
from the Ministry of higher education […] to send Sivachev again for a half a year 
research trip in America.”66 As a result of this recommendation, Sivachev visited the 
uSA a second time in November of 1967 as a Soviet oficial in charge of the Soviet 
exhibition “education in the uSSr” supported by oficial letters of recommendation 
from the Soviet leadership, including one signed by his oficial “supervisor,” 
L. Bazhanov, a “kgB man” from the uSSr Ministry of education.67 Starting in late 
1967, Sivachev visited the united States on regular basis; eventually he became the 
most famous and the most respected Soviet academic visitor in America, especially 
during the era of détente. American scholars contrasted Sivachev as a talented 
researcher to other Soviet “not very interesting visitors, who were curiosities but not 
serious scholars.” As they reported to ireX, Sivachev “impressed everybody very 
much with his knowledge of American institutions.”68 After his American visits and 
intensive archival research, Sivachev prepared two book manuscripts about labor 
and government relations in uS history before and during WWii.69 
By 1975 Nikolai Sivachev became the best representative of Soviet Americanists 
in all the exchanges programs of the détente era. Sivachev also was a good scholar, 
64. The result of this visit was the first (kandidatskaia) dissertation, published later as a book: Nikolai V. Sivachev, Politicheskaia bor´ba v SShA v seredine 30‑kh godov XX v. [Political Struggle in the uSA in the Middle of the 1930s] (M., 1966).
65. Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 917, l. 2, 8. even the Soviet policy analysts, who were present, 
praised this manuscript. 
66. Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 1009, l. 14.
67. See about this in LC. ireX. rC 68, F 36, p. 23, 25, and letter of L. Bazhanov, November 28, 1967. Compare with my interviews with Bolkhovitinov, Yale richmond and Donald raleigh, and Yale richmond, Cultural exchange and the Cold War: raising the iron Curtain, (university Park, PA, 2003),  43‑44. Sivachev’s colleagues spread rumors about Sivachev’s establishing official kgB connections during this visit to the uSA in 1967. (interview with robert ivanov and igor Dementiev, March 21, 1991, Moscow, iVi, uSSr Academy of Sciences).
68. LC. ireX. rC 21, F 113 (1972), p.2.
69. LC. ireX. rC 21, F 39 (1976); Nikolai V. Sivachev, Pravovoe regulirovanie trudovykh 
otnoshenii v SShA [Legal regulation of Labor relations in the uSA] (M., 1972), idem, rabochaia politika pravitel´stva SShA v gody vtoroi mirovoi voiny [Labor Politics of uS government during WWii] (M., 1974). his major findings were summarized in his last book: SShA: gosudarstvo i rabochii klass: (ot obrazovaniia Soedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki do okonchaniia vtoroi mirovoi voiny) [The uSA: The State and Working Class: From the Origin of the united States of America to the Second World War](M., 1982). 
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a serious historian‑researcher, and a very good psychologist who understood very 
well what the American partners expected from the Soviet guests. in contrast to 
his image of a “pedantic boring university professor” and “orthodox communist 
ideologist” for his Soviet students and colleagues, Sivachev projected a very 
different image of himself for his American colleagues. For Americans he always 
looked optimistic, smiling, open‑minded, humorous and ready for discussions, 
trying to avoid any ideological debates and distancing himself from the explicit 
communist propagandist clichés.70 As one American host praised Sivachev’s 
research and communicative skills in 1975, 
[…] Sivachev […] steers away from Sovietologists in general (his ield is uS internal politics) but has been good with me because i provided him with connections (with ViPs) he couldn’t establish otherwise – and took his pictures posing with these ViPs which he values a great deal. he is relatively young, ambitious, extremely hard working, especially for a teaching professor, in collecting archival and bibliographic data; he knows what he wants and has a great deal of determination … on his part, he was very considerate in not taking too much of my time, and quite informative about general intellectual trends in Moscow. A stout russian nationalist (although a Mordovian, ethnically), he was a curious contrast with the more ideologically oriented visitors … Since his irst visit to the uS he has developed rather broad connections (once he was a house guest of eleanor roosevelt, and knew my friend henry A. Wallace) but remained a rather modest sort. There is an authentic strength in this fellow, and he will go far in my judgment.71
using his new American connections during the 1970s, Sivachev obtained a contract 
with the university of Chicago Press to publish a book in english about the history 
of uS‑Soviet relations. So he contacted Nikolai Yakovlev, another talented Soviet 
historian‑Americanist, nevyezdnoi, but very proliic writer, who collaborated 
with the kgB; he invited him to be a co‑author of the American book. Through 
this contact with Yakovlev, Sivachev received the oficial kgB permission for 
collaboration with this American publishing house. Then, using ireX funding, 
Sivachev spent six months in 1978‑1979 and two months in 1980 reading the proofs 
of their book and collecting material on American labor‑government relations. 
in 1980, Sivachev not only published the book in the uSA, but also served as 
a Visiting Fellow in the Department of government at Dartmouth College.72 
Moreover, Sivachev helped many his Mgu students to establish the necessary 
connections in America and obtained oficial invitations and funding by American 
hosts. So Sivachev had supervised a research work of Vladimir Sogrin since 
1967, assisting him with obtaining the new literature on the history of ideology of 
70. Various people, like his former Mgu students Vladislav Zubok and Marina Vlasova, and 
his American colleague donald Raleigh, noted this.
71. LC. ireX. rC 21, F 17, Vladimir Petrov’s letter of February 3,1975, p. 2.
72. LC. ireX. rC 180, F 66 (1978‑80). Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai Yakovlev, Russia and the united States: u.S.‑Soviet relations from the Soviet Point of View (Chicago, 1980).
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political elites in the uSA. Finally, in 1979 Sivachev directed Sogrin to the topic of 
the American War of independence and its ideology. he recommended his former 
student for iReX funding. As a result of Sivachev’s “American connections” and 
his research visits in the uSA, Sogrin wrote his pioneering studies in a history of 
American ideology, which incorporated the original American material, suggested 
by Sivachev as early as the late 1960s.73   
Another famous Soviet Americanist, nikolai Bolkhovitinov, a historian of 
russian‑American relations during the late 18th through the 19th centuries, 
began visiting the united States in 1968. Bolkhovitinov came to America with the 
established reputation of a serious historian, visiting the major research centers and 
archival collections on the east and West coasts, giving public lectures, meeting 
his American colleagues and impressing them with his erudition and knowledge 
of the material. Moreover, Bolkhovitinov was one of the pioneers of the concept 
of “people’s diplomacy” in the international history of diplomacy, which attracted 
American specialists in uS diplomatic history. As Bolkhovitinov explained his 
concept in 1980, 
in the past historians of international relations very seldom studied socio‑political, scientiic and cultural ties. Their attention was centered on inter‑state and, irst and foremost, diplomatic relations, on the activity of 
prominent statesmen, famous generals and diplomats, tsars and presidents. This left out of the history of international relations the principal element, 
the people, as represented by the inest, most educated and active personages – scholars, public igures, men of letters, journalists. i see my main merit in trying to overcome this shortcoming and to study relations between russia and the uSA in their fullest dimension, comprehensively, including the history of trade, socio‑political, scientiic and cultural ties, the history of russian America, the business contacts of russian “promyshlenniki” (fur traders) and Boston merchant‑sailors, and other connections.74 
During Bolkhovitinov’s visit of 1968, the historians from harvard university 
decided to translate his book in english and publish it in the united States, and 
robert Webb, editor‑in‑chief of the prestigious American historical review, after 
attending Bolkhovitinov’s lecture about American studies in the uSSr, decided 
to publish this lecture in his journal.75 Through the entire 1970s, American hosts 
73. LC. ireX. rC 187, F 48 (1979). See about a recommendation of Sogrin for Mgu graduate program in Arkhiv Mgu, f.  9, op.  8, d.  1009, l.  93. Among his books see: V.V. Sogrin, istoki sovremennoi burzhuaznoi ideologii v SShA [The roots of Contemporary Bourgeois ideology in the uSA](M., 1975); idem, ideinye techenia v Amerikanskoi revoliutsii XViii  veka [the ideological currents in the American Revolution of the 18th Century] (M., 1980), and idem, Osnovateli SShA: istoricheskie portrety [the Founders of the uSA: historical Portraits] (M., 1983).
74. Bolkhovitinov, “how i Became a historian,” 111.
75. Nikolai N.  Bolkhovitinov, “The Study of united States history in the Soviet union,” American historical review, 74, 4 (1969): 1221‑1242. See Bolkhovitinov, Vospominaniia, 47‑48, 50, 53. See also his official academic report about his visit in the uSA in 1968: 
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expressed their respect for such a decent and competent historian as Bolkhovitinov, 
and kept inviting him to visit America. As Professor Jack P. greene from Johns 
hopkins university noted, “i think the only one serious Soviet scholar of modern 
uS history, who visited the united States during the détente, was Bolkhovitinov.”76
Because of his conlict with the kgB, Bolkhovitinov was not allowed to 
spend more than a month annually visiting the united States during the 1970s. 
Despite this conlict, the kgB was unable to stop Bolkhovitnov visiting America. 
By 1976, in both Soviet and American archives, he collected rare important 
documents, illustrating the establishment of russian‑American diplomatic 
relations over the course of 1807‑1809. Due to the diplomacy of détente, both 
Soviet and American diplomats and political leaders frequently referred to these 
documents about the beginning of russian‑uS relations. As a result, the uS 
Department of State and the uSSr Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned 
the oficial publication of these documents.77 therefore, Bolkhovitnov’s research 
attracted the attention of Soviet and American diplomats, and he was invited to 
lead the project of these documents’ publication. Bolkhovitinov’s books were 
translated and published in english in the united States, and inally he became 
one of the editors of the documentary publication sponsored by the Soviet and 
American governments.78 Bolkhovitinov brought a huge collection of documents 
and American dissertations on various issues of uS history, and deposited this 
collection in Moscow libraries. Moreover, he always tried to help his nevyezdnye 
colleagues, bringing the copies of important documents from uS archives. 
in this way he brought copies of documents on the seventeenth century Virginia 
N.N.  Bolkhovitinov, “V arkhivakh i bibliotekakh SShA: nakhodki, vstrechi, vpechatlenia [in Archives and Libraries of the uSA: Findings, Meetings, impressions],” Ae. 1971, 329‑340, compare with his essay: “O vremeni i o sebe” 73‑74.
76. interview with Jack P.  greene, September 15, 1998, Baltimore. See how American historians praised Bolkhovitinov: Marcus rediker, “The Old guard, the New guard, and the People at the gates: New Approaches to the Study of American history in the uSSr,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 1991 (October), vol. 48, 580‑597; John T. Alexander, “Catherine the great and the rats,” in Samuel h.  Baron and Cathy A.  Frierson, eds., Adventures in russian historical research: reminiscences of American Scholars from the Cold War to the Present (Armonk, NY, 2003), 54, 56, 58; Donald J. raleigh, “A Journey from St. Petersburg to Saratov,” ibid., 145. See also the best biographical essay about Bolkhovitinov in russian: B.N. komissarov, “As otechestvennoi amerikanistiki (k 70‑letiiu N.N. Bolkhovitinova),” [Ace of the russian American Studies (Celebrating 70‑Years Anniversary of N.N. Bolkhovitinov)] in A.O. Chubarian, ed., russkoe otkrytie Ameriki: Sbornik statei, posviashchionnyi 70‑letiu 
akademika nikolaia nikolaievicha Bolkhovitinova, [The russian Discovery of America: The Collection of the essays Devoted to 70‑years Anniversary of Nikolai Nikolaievich Bolkhovitinov] (M., 2002), 8‑33. 
77. See Bolkhovitinov, Vospominaniia, 50‑51, 52, 53.
78. Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, The Beginnings of russian‑American relations, 1775‑1815 (Cambridge, MA, 1975);  idem, russko‑amerikanskie otnosheniia, 1815‑1832 [russian‑American relations, 1815‑1832] (M., 1975); idem, Russia and the American 
Revolution (Tallahassee, Fl., 1975); rossiia i SShA: stanovlenie otnoshenii, 1765‑1815: Sbornik dokumentov [russia and the uSA: Formation of the relations, 1765‑1815: Collection of Documents] (M., 1980); N.N. Bashkina, N.N. Bolkhovitinov, J.h. Brown et al., eds., the united States and russia: The Beginning of relations, 1765‑1815: Collection of Documents, (Washington, D.C., 1980).
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in 1976 to Sergei Burin, who was not allowed to travel abroad, and who was 
writing his dissertation about the social history of the english colonies Virginia 
and Maryland. using his connections in the Library of Congress and other 
American libraries, Bolkhovitinov also organized a subscription of various 
American historical magazines for central Soviet libraries.79
All the Soviet historians‑Americanists who were active participants of the 
academic exchanges not only incorporated the new indings of their American 
colleagues in their own scholarship, but also began the publication of their own 
analysis of the major developments in uS history writing and of the contemporary 
trends in American historiography.80 Overall, during the 1970s, after their visits 
to America, Soviet Americanists‑historians produced a variety of new research 
topics in uS history: a comparison of the 18th century American and French 
revolutions and American revolutionary ideology (A. Fursenko and Sogrin); the 
agrarian question and farmers’ movement in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
(g. kuropiatnik and e. Yaz´kov); the Civil War and reconstruction (r.  ivanov 
and A. Blinov), American “Progressives” and liberal “reformers” (i. Beliavskaia 
and Sogrin); the anthropological history of American indians (Yu.  Averkieva 
and A.  Vashchenko); history of immigration in America (A.  Shlepakov and 
L.  Leshchenko); the traditionally popular themes of American working class 
history (i. krasnov, V. Mal´kov, B. Mikhailov and Sivachev) and “diplomacy and 
ideology of uS imperialism” (i. Dementiev and A. Fursenko).81
At the same time, Soviet Americanists followed certain “discursive strategies” 
in publications of the results of their research in America. The Soviet state both tried 
to control professional Americanists and needed their expertise, and this resulted in 
a tangled and paradoxical structure of discourse. State and party oficials promoted 
those practices that it the contemporary political agenda, while Americanists sought 
legitimation and support from those in power. Tensions within both oficial political 
discourse and professional Americanists’ discourses produced a considerable room 
for maneuver and negotiation. According to Slava Gerovitch, Soviet Americanists 
developed their various discursive strategies 
[…] in an attempt to adapt their knowledge to the current political, socioeconomic, and cultural situation, and to inluence this situation at the same time. Such discursive strategies had to be lexible enough to take advantage of the tensions within public discourse. On the other hand, in order 
79. interview with Sergei Burin. using the material, brought by Bolkhovitinov from America, Burin eventually defended his dissertation in 1978: S.N. Burin, Sotsial´nye protivorechiia i konflikty v Virginii i Marilende (1642‑1676): [Social Contradictions and Conflicts in Virginia and Maryland, 1642‑1676] Avtoref. dis. kand. ist. nauk (M., 1978).
80. The best study of the new trends in uS historiography was written by Bolkhovitinov as a result of his research trips to the uSA, SShA: Problemy istorii.
81. See the best summary of the Soviet history writing about uS history in: Bolkhovitinov, SShA: Problemy istorii, 339‑378. Compare with another survey: N. Sivachev and i. Savel´eva, “American Labor in recent Soviet historiography,” Labor history, 18, 3 (Summer 1977): 407‑432.
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to keep up with sociopolitical changes, professionals would have to frequently modify these strategies.82
For many Soviet Americanists, who visited America, the safest discursive strategy 
in presenting their American indings was accepting the authoritative (ruling) 
discourse of orthodox Marxism, 
[…] not searching for truth, but merely attempting to document a preconception [of Marxist ideology]. As some Americans noted, some of their Soviet guests visited libraries and archives [in the uS] not for the kind of serious and prolonged study […] but basically to indicate in [their] preface that [they] had visited a large number of American libraries and archives. [Our] impression also was that [they] sought quotations, lists, and information of that kind to buttress conclusions [they] had already reached.83 
This strategy, which i call “conformist,” became the most popular among a majority 
of Soviet Americanists. unfortunately, the depth of understanding of the united 
States among the older generation remained very shallow. A majority of these irst 
professional Soviet Americanists were burdened by the Marxist belief system, 
image structures, and categories of analysis. They suffered from a great deal of 
cognitive dissonance and simply looked for evidence to conirm their preconceived 
images of how the united States functioned.84  
Another strategy was developed by Soviet Americanists who resented 
propaganda clichés of the Stalin era and the oficial Cold War discourse. These 
Americanists frequently turned to what some scholars called “internalist” historical 
narratives as a means of both analysis and self‑protection. That is, they tried to 
avoid any serious analytical approach that could be presented as non‑Marxist 
theoretical deviation by the ideological censors and instead emphasized the inner 
logic of the historical development of the united States.85 Some Americanists, like 
Bolkhovitinov, began to gravitate toward an internalist approach, their main concern 
became “objectivity,” meaning an effort to ground their narrative in hard facts from 
archival documents rather than in purely ideological or speculative interpretations.86 
For this reason, Soviet Americanists took to illing their works with “factological” 
material and made little or no attempt to analyze and interpret it. This strategy 
was politically safe, and at the same time the author could demonstrate some 
82. Slava gerovitch, “Writing history in the Present Tense: Cold War‑era Discursive Strategies of Soviet historians of Science and Technology,” in Simpson, ed., universities and empire, 189‑228, 190.
83. LC. ireX. rC 229, F 15, ivan M. krasnov’s file, letter by robert F. Byrnes, May 23, 1972. ibid, rC 21, F 113. 
84. Compare with the similar developments among Chinese Americanists in Shambaugh, 
Beautiful imperialist, 283.
85. i follow here a logic of Slava gerovitch, “Writing history in the Present Tense,” 199.
86. See the similar developments in American historiography in Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American historical Profession, (New York, 1988).
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personal intellectual independence by disregarding Marxist‑Leninist interpretive 
clichés. The ideological censors of the day could not point to “bias” in a research 
work, in which there was no explicit analysis and facts “spoke for themselves.” 
An attentive reader, however, could ind the author’s “subjectivity” transferred 
from the analytical to the factological level, “revealed in the selection of evidence 
and construction of historical narrative.”87
Another discursive strategy, commonly practiced by the Soviet Americanists, was 
to use criticism of recent Western scholarship as an introduction of the new ideas 
to the Soviet reader. According to contemporaries, titles like “criticism of Recent 
Concepts of Bourgeois Falsiiers” served more than once as an umbrella for discussion 
of scholarly ideas that would otherwise be inaccessible in printed form in the uSSr. 
As gerovitch noted, “this particularly paradoxical discursive strategy permitted Soviet 
historians to mask their disagreement (with one another) by the lack of criticism, 
while downplaying their accord (with some Western colleagues) by the presence of 
criticism.”88 During the 1970s and the 80s many young Soviet Americanists enjoyed 
reading various Soviet critical surveys of “bourgeois falsiiers,” published by Moscow 
scholars, including so‑called referativnye sborniki iNiON [The Synopsis of the 
recent Western Scholarship: Collections by the institute of Scientiic information] 
, trying to ind a precious information about modern theoretical approaches in 
Western historiography and social sciences. This “critical” discursive strategy 
became the most popular especially among Americanists from iSkAN and iMeMO. 
As contemporaries noted, Soviet intellectuals “beneited from a proliferation of 
russian‑language reviews of Western scholarship. Continuing a practice begun 
in the early 1960s, an overall critical orientation permitted such works to pass the 
censors while conveying much about Western theory as well as the reality of Western 
political life.”89 Some Americanists still remember how, in the 1970s, they began 
a serious study of uS political science with reading such “critical anti‑American” 
literature, written by the recent participants in ireX academic exchanges programs. 
For the class discussions about American political system, Sivachev and his students 
used different editions of such books, which eventually became the “Soviet classics 
of anti‑American political science.”90 
87. gerovitch, “Writing history,” 199‑200. 
88. ibid., 200‑201. As contemporaries recalled that such “critical” reviews and analyses “served as a … means of familiarizing researchers with [Western thought and practice] […] in many cases such works were written for the purpose of disseminating this information, employing a critical orientation as a cover to obtain consent for publication.” See in Vladimir Shlapentokh, The Politics of Sociology in the Soviet union (Boulder, CO, 1987), 16.
89. See in english, russia and idea of the West, 129. For many Americanists, like Arbatov, their work as translator‑reviewers of foreign‑language political and economic work for various Soviet reference editions was “instrumental in shedding dogmas about the West.” See Arbatov, The System, 34.
90. See the most popular among Moscow Americanists books, written by the Soviet participants in ireX programs: V.g.  kalenskii, Politicheskaia nauka v S.Sh.A. kritika burzhuaznykh 
kontseptsii vlasti [Political Science in the uSA: Criticism of Bourgeois Concepts of Power] (M., 1969) and iu. Zamoshkin, ed., Amerikanskoe obshchestvennoe mnenie i politika, [American Public Opinion and Politics] (M., 1978). Marina Vlasova mentioned this fact in her interview.
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The most important version of the “critical” discursive strategy was so‑called 
strategy of the “critical recommendations and advising.” in this way, Soviet 
Americanists used their criticism of the recent American scholarship and 
American realities with the goal to offer practical recommendations about 
Soviet historiography, social science, politics, culture, economy and diplomacy. 
During the 1970s and 80s, the researchers from iSkAN and iMeMO, who just 
recently returned from the uSA, prepared published recommendations for Soviet 
political leadership about various economic, political and diplomatic problems, 
using American economic and political experience.91 After visiting America, 
Americanists‑historians, such as Bolkhovitinov and Sivachev, recommended 
Soviet scholars to study and use the new research methods of the recent American 
scholarship, especially the works by the representatives of so‑called “new social,” 
“new economic” and “new political” histories.92 the recent visitors to America 
organized the All‑union conferences, promoting the new research methods of 
their American colleagues in the uSSr, but also supported the academic career 
of their talented students like Sergei Stankevich, who studied uS presidential 
campaigns, using the approaches of American “new political historians.”93     
According to contemporaries, the most important advisers in the process of 
buying uS ilms and commenting them for the Soviet audiences were those Soviet 
experts who worked in iSkAN. They not only published highly‑acclaimed books 
about uS cinema during the 1970s, but also submitted their recommendations 
about the most popular and “progressive” American ilms to Soviet leadership.94 
As a result of iSkAN Americanists’ “advising strategy,” in 1974 Soveksportilm 
released six uS ilms, in 1977 twelve American ilms among the 63 ilms released 
91. i refer to Prognozy razvitiia avtomatizatsii proizvodstva v mashinostroenii v SShA [Prognosis of the Development of Automation of Production in Machine‑Building in the uSA] (M.: iSkAN, 1978), and many other documents, such “the untitled internal institute document reviewing iSkAN’s main policy recommendations of 1968‑79,” provided by a former iSkAN Deputy Director Sergei Plekhanov to robert english in July 1991, quoted in english, Russia and idea of the West, 156. See also a detailed description of various “analytical reports,” submitted by iSkAN Americanists to the Soviet government in Barbara L. Dash, A defector Reports, 10‑12.
92. See discussions of the new methods in Sivachev’s research in Arkhiv Mgu, f. 9, op. 8, d. 917, part 1, l. 8, and Bolkhovitinov, SShA: Problemy istorii , 22, 23 ff.
93. See about this strategy of advising in the list of activities during the 1970s in L.V. Shut´ko 
et al., eds., nikolai nikolaevich Bolkhovitinov, (M., 2002), 4‑6, 44‑52. About Stankevich’s research see S. Stankevich, “‘Novaia ekonomicheskaia politika’ administratsii r. Niksona v 1971‑1974 gg.,” [New economic Policy of Nixon’s Administration in 1971‑74] Ae 1986, 5‑23.
94. unfortunately, the recent scholarship about Soviet film consumption ignores the influence of détente and a role of the Soviet experts in foreign films’ acquisition in the uSSr. See, e.g. kristin roth‑ey, Moscow Prime Time: how the Soviet union Built the Media empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (ithaca: Cornell university Press, 2011), 115‑120, about coverage of foreign films and western movie stars in a magazine Sovietskii ekran [Soviet Movie Screen] from 1960 to 1965. And no mentioning of détente at all!  Compare with the most popular books about uS cinema, prepared by the Soviet Americanists during that period: Viacheslav Shestakov, Amerika v zerkale ekrana: Amerikanskoe kino 70‑kh godov [America in the Mirror of a Screen: American Cinema of the 1970s] (M., 1977); na ekrane Amerika [On the Movie Screen – America] Collection edited by i.e.  kokarev (M., 1978); A.S.  Muliarchik and V.P.  Shestakov, eds., Amerikanskaia khudozhestvennaia kul´tura v sotsial´no‑politicheskom kontekste 70‑kh godov 20 veka [American Artistic Culture in Social and Political Context of the 1970s] (M., 1982).
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from socialist countries and 67 movies from capitalist countries; and during 1979‑82 
an average of eight uS movies annually.95 in 1976, Soviet ideologists sponsored a 
special conference with a participation of iSkAN’s experts to discuss the problems 
of American cinema and uS feature ilms, appropriate for the Soviet audiences.96 
During this conference, Viacheslav Shestakov, a Soviet historian of uS ilms, who 
was funded by ireX for his research trip in uS in 1974‑75, delivered a special report 
about the recent “democratic progressive” trends in hollywood and recommended 
the leaders of Goskino buy ilms by Francis Coppola, Martin Scorsese and other 
“talented” American ilm directors. Yuri Zamoshkin and other Soviet participants of 
ireX programs joined Shestakov in his criticism of “lack of professionalism” of those 
Soviet ilm critics, who “rejected all, even anti‑capitalist progressive, American ilms 
as mere bourgeois propaganda.”97 After 1979 with an access to the new American 
video tape recording techniques, the experts in uS cinema, such as A. Muliarchik and 
Shestakov, organized special shows of new uS movies at iSkAN on a regular basis. 
These Americanists played an instrumental role in the mass release of the majority 
uS movies in the Soviet union during the Brezhnev era.98
Soviet Americanists employed lexible discursive strategies to convey the 
desired meaning without violating the constraints of the then politically acceptable 
language. According to some scholars, Soviet academic discourse was “not 
as a container of a particular ideology or theory, but rather as a mechanism for 
advancing a certain agenda via disciplinary knowledge.”99 in practice, Soviet 
Americanists mixed various discursive strategies together. But the strategy of 
“critical recommendations” usually became the most prominent in their discursive 
practices after their frequent research visits in America. 
95. Sovetskii ekran, 1971, No. 24, 19; 1972, No. 24, 17; 1974, No. 24, 17; 1977, No. 24, 17; 1979, No. 24, 15; 1981, No. 24, 15; 1982, No. 22, 15; iskusstvo kino, [Art of Cinema] 1980, No. 6, 192. See about the influences of American movies on the Soviet audiences during the Brezhnev era in: Sergei i.  Zhuk, “Zapad v sovetskom ‘zakrytom’ gorode: ‘chuzhoe’ kino, ideologiia i problemy kul´turnoi identichnosti na ukraine v brezhnevskuiu epokhu (1864‑1982 gody) [The West in the Soviet ‘Closed’ City: Western Films, ideology and Problems of Cultural identification in ukraine during the Brezhnev era (1964‑1982)],” novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, [New Literary review] 2009, No. 100 (6), 548‑565.
96. See about this conference in Valerij golovskoi, “Amerikanskoe kino – “za” i “protiv” (konferentsia 1976 goda),” [American Cinema – pro and contra (A Conference of 1976)] idem, eto bylo nedavno… izbrannye publikatsii za 30 let [in Days of Yore: Selected Publications for 30 Years] (Baltimore, MD: Seagull Press, 2010), 156‑163. See also his essay, “Amerikanskie fil´my na sovetskikh ekranakh (1957‑1980) [American Movies on the Soviet Screens, 1957‑1980],” golovskoi, eto bylo nedavno, [in Days of Yore] 169‑177. 
97. golovskoi, “Amerikanskoe kino,” 161, 162‑163; LC. ireX. rC 228, F 43, “about visit of Viacheslav Shestakov (Nov. 1974‑April 1975) from the institute of Cinematic history and Theory of the State Committee for Cinematography,” and rC 237, F26: about visit of iurii Zamoshkin from iSkAN, Nov.‑Dec. 1977.
98. See my e‑mail correspondence with Vladislav Zubok, May 28, 2013 and golovskoi, May 8, 2013. golovskoi recalled how a chair of the goskino F. ermash and other representatives of Soviet administration discussed a possibility of Soviet release of uS movies the Godfather 
and Apocalypse Now, which were shown for the “selected audiences” in Moscow during the end of the 1970s. See in golovskoi, “Amerikanskoe kino,” 158‑159.
99. gerovitch, “Writing history,” 217‑218.
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Overall, the longer Soviet Americanists stayed in uS, the more positive impressions 
of America they developed and brought back in the uSSr. They improved their 
english language speaking ability and communicative skills, and gained professional 
experience as experts in uS history, politics and culture, “not only working at the 
American archives and libraries, but also participating in everyday life of ordinary 
Americans, going shopping, watching ‘sitcom’ series on American television, and the 
new hollywood blockbusters in American movie theaters.” After frequent visits to 
the uSA and long staying there in the 1970s, many Soviet Americanists recalled how 
they “developed great admiration for the West, for the united States […] respect for 
the country, its strength, its people.”100 All Soviet Americanists noted how important 
the personal contacts with Americans were for their own “discovery” of America 
and the construction of their mental images of American society and culture. Both 
Bolkhovitinov and Fursenko acknowledged that living with Americans, in their 
homes, in the student dorms inluenced them more than just their business, academic, 
relations. Bolkhovitinov recalled how in 1968, staying in the dorm of Cornell 
university, he spent the nights talking with local students, discussing political and 
cultural problems such as the Vietnam War and music.101 he came to America “with 
preconceived notions about the internal crisis in American capitalist society,” and 
he eventually realized that these notions were wrong. he saw “how talented were 
these young members of American society” and “how they were capable of critical 
self‑analysis and self‑government.” “They were more self eficient and self‑reliable 
than our Soviet youth,” recalled Bolkhovitinov after witnessing American college 
students “organizing their own meetings, dancing parties and keeping order and 
respect for human dignity for everyone without any hierarchical distinctions, which 
were typical for Soviet society” in those days.102 Soviet guests were impressed not 
only with good conditions of life and research in America, but also with optimism, 
energy and individual initiative of ordinary Americans. Both their reports to their 
Soviet administration and the reports of their American hosts relected this positive 
reaction. As one American host noted in 1973 that Soviet Americanist A. Fursenko 
was overwhelmed not only with research capacities in uS colleges, but also with his 
cordial reception by Americans, which led to “mutual understanding”: 
The greatest mutual beneit, i would judge, came from Mr. Fursenko’s stay at my house. We have known each other for 16 years and corresponded on professional matters. he knows that i know something of the hidden aspects of Soviet life and treat them with some compassion; he knows i will not be critical of his country. he also appreciated being taken into my family and receive an inside view of 
100. i quoted my interview with robert F. ivanov, Moscow, June 25, 1991, and english, russia and idea of the West, 150. Another Soviet Americanist who became a diplomat noted, “You start to resemble the people, the country, where you work, and this was especially so for those who worked on the uSA. it took a higher level of professionalism and culture, and such experience changes your outlook.” ibid., 298.
101. See his official report: Bolkhovitinov, “V arkhivakh…” 329‑340, compare with his essay: “O vremeni i o sebe,” 73‑74.
102. Bolkhovitinov, Vospominaniia, 50‑51. See interview with Bolkhovitinov, June 2, 2001, Moscow.
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American society, without embellishment or ostentation. he in turn freely shared with us his family problems (though my wife did not convert him to women’s lib). At any rate, we managed to establish and to deepen a basic human trust between us which transcends all differences of nationality and ideology. he is a sincere person, genuinely interested in understanding American realities without ideological blinders, though a patriotic citizen of the Soviet union and conforming to its politics. he considers it his mission to bring American realities closer to the Soviet public, rejoicing over the current détente in Soviet‑American relations.103
The discursive practices of Soviet scholars relected not only their research work 
in America, but, irst of all, their “face to face communication with American 
colleagues as well.” As some scholars noted later, “these personal ties and this 
intellectual cross‑fertilization, together with détente’s exposure to foreign life, 
powerfully abetted the rise of a global outlook during the era of stagnation.”104 
conclusion
Academic détente as the entire relaxation of the international relations during the 
Brezhnev era had a very limited and elitist character, especially for American studies 
in the uSSr. According to the available documents, no more than 600  Soviet 
Americanists visited the united States during this time, and almost 80 percent of 
these Soviet academic visitors were representatives of academic and state oficials, 
with only 4 female scholars (less than 1 percent). So it was predominantly male 
community of Soviet visitors. Sometimes, the talented and young Soviet scholars 
could manage to get to America as “supporting assistants” (soprovozhdaiushchie) 
of Soviet state apparatchiks. The most typical cases were the “American” visits of 
young Sivachev in 1967 as “an assistant” of the oficial from the uSSr Ministry 
of education, and of Shestakov, “assisting” V. Baskakov, director of the uSSr 
institute of Cinematic history and Theory of the State Committee for Cinemato‑
graphy during their oficial visit in 1974. The social background of Soviet visi‑
tors also relected the elitist character of Soviet academic détente: – more than 
70 percent of Soviet researchers in America came from families of Soviet intellec‑
tual and party elite, and almost 80 percent of them represented the research centers 
(such as iSkAN and iMeMO) from only one city – Moscow.
Overall, the discursive practices of Soviet Americanists it the Soviet 
authoritative discourse. But after their American visits, many, especially young 
Soviet researchers, added to the prevailing “factological” discursive strategies 
their new scenario of “critical recommendations and advising.” They criticized their 
American counterparts, but at the same time, they advised Soviet leadership about 
103. LC. ireX. rC 21, F 109, letter by Theodore Von Laue, May 15, 1973, pp. 1‑2. “Poor man: his visit in the u.S. was so hectic, too much to be observed and digested! i wonder how he feels now, back in Leningrad, with all his presents and his memories…”
104. interview with Leshchenko, June 25, 2013, kyiv; english, russia and idea of the West, 128.
328 Sergei i. Zhuk
American politics, economy and culture, and also popularized American realities, 
cultural products, theories and approaches among ordinary Soviet audiences. 
unfortunately, Soviet Americanists’ “advising practices” also had limited and 
uneven character during the Brezhnev era. Soviet leaders used the iSkAN 
and iMeMO policy analysts’ advices and recommendations about uS policy and 
diplomacy up to 1979. Not until perestroika did Americanists resume their active 
“advising” functions for Soviet politicians. Soviet leaders also ignored major 
recommendations of Americanists about dissemination of uS cultural products 
in the uSSr. Only limited number of uS movies from the lists recommended by 
iSkAN experts was selected by goskino for showing in Soviet movie theaters. 
The most recommended (by Americanists) ilms, like the Godfather and 
Apocalypse Now, were never released in the Soviet union. Soviet historians also 
had limited success in promoting the new theoretical approaches from America. 
Their publications were censored, and they were punished by bans for their travel 
to America for the slightest “ideological deviation.”
But in a longer historical perspective, Soviet participation in academic détente 
was successful. Soviet Americanists began their own participation in creation of an 
international community of scholars, becoming the partners in academic exchange 
with their American colleagues. They established good relations not only with 
American experts in uS history, politics and culture, but also with American specialists 
in russian/Soviet studies. To some extent, participation of Soviet Americanists in this 
international community would not only shape the development of American studies 
in the uSSr, but also inluence russian studies in America. After visiting America, 
Soviet Americanists became hosts for American guests, experts in russian studies, 
building strong personal connections with them – Bolkhovitinov with Norman 
Saul, Sivachev with Donald raleigh, Vladimir Sogrin with Saul and Alfred rieber, 
etc. eventually, through these personal connections Soviet Americanists and their 
American colleagues created an important academic international network, which 
involved their students as well, and which survived the collapse of the Soviet union 
in 1991. Paradoxically, as a result of expanding this network during the 1990s, not 
only American Sovietologists beneited from these connections, but the entire ield 
of russian studies in America became inluenced by former Soviet Americanists, 
students of Arbatov, Bolkhovitinov, Sivachev and Fursenko. using this network, 
these former Soviet scholars, like Vladislav Zubok (an expert in Carter’s presidential 
campaign), Sergei Plekhanov (a scholar of American political science), Andrei 
Znamenskii (a specialist in history and anthropology of American indians) and 
myself (an expert in social history of colonial New York and Pennsylvania) moved to 
North America and now teach russian history and politics there. 
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